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INTRODUCTION
Within the hospital industry1 in the United States there are few issues more
controversial than that concerning the role of proprietary hospitals and the con-
sequences of their operation.2 This controversy is striking in view of the fact that in
1968 only 13.2 per cent of all nonfederal, short-term general and other special hos-
pitals were proprietary, accounting for only six per cent of the total beds. Fur-
thermore, the proportion of proprietary hospitals and beds has been declining over
time, and yet the debate over proprietary hospitals has grown in recent years.
What accounts for this apparent increase in interest? No doubt it is due in part
to a general increase in interest in the hospital industry as a whole. Mounting dis-
satisfaction with the voluntary, nonprofit mode of hospital operation has grown as
hospital costs have increased relative to other prices. It has been argued that the
virtue of profit-seeking hospitals is their greater incentive to control costs. Others
argue that cost control, or lower costs, comes at the expense of quality of care or by
selective admission of simple cases. Associated with this debate has been the recent
spectacular performance in the stock prices of the recently formed proprietary hos-
pital corporations which own a chain of hospitals.4
But whatever the source of interest in proprietary hospitals, the literature on
them is woefully incomplete. The debate has been unencumbered by evidence that
could conceivably resolve the difference in views, and the discussion has been polem-
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'The ensuing discussion is limited to short-term hospitals (at least 5o% of patients stay 30 days or
less) unless otherwise stated, excluding federal, psychiatric, and tuberculosis hospitals. This subject matter
corresponds to the American Hospital Association's (AHA) classification "Nonfederal, short-term general
and other special" hospitals. It is primarily within this sphere that the current controversy over pro-
prietaries exists.
'Proprietary hospitals are those which are owned and operated for a profit by individuals, partner-
ships, or corporations. Other major forms of ownership are voluntary nonprofit (under church or com-
munity sponsorship) and governmental (owned and operated at some level of government). The words
proprietary and for-profit will be used interchangeably in this paper as they are in hospital literature.
' HOSPITALS (GUIDE IssUE), Aug. I, 1969, pt. 2, at 475.
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Chains (mimeo. May 22, 1970); Proprietary Hospitals Go Public, MODERN HOSPITAL, Mar. x969, at 8o;
Big, Bigger, Biggest-For-Profit Hospitals Chains Expand, MODERN HosPITAL, Aug. r969, at 99; These
Are Claims for Hospital Corporations: Capital, Talent, Size, Centralization, MODERN HOSPITAL, Dec. r969,
at ,o2; More Companies Enter Hospital Field: Alarm Non-Profit Institutions, Wall Street Journal,
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ical. This paper represents an attempt to evaluate what evidence exists that bears on
the issues immediately presented in this debate. It is divided into three parts. First,
there is a brief statistical and descriptive history of proprietary hospitals. The second
part is a quantitative description of proprietary hospitals as they exist today, with
some emphasis placed on current trends and on influences on the share of the
hospital market held by proprietaries. An attempt is made to build a statistical
"model" that will, in part, explain the role of the proprietary sector of the hospital
industry. Third, there is a summary of the main issues that surround proprietary
hospitals. This is an attempt to extract from the literature the main arguments,
pro and con, that seem to center on basic points of contention regarding proprietary
hospitals.
I
HISTORY
In 1873 the U.S. Bureau of Education reported 178 hospitals of all types in the
United States By i9o9, according to the American Medical Association, there were
4359 hospitals in the United States.0 During this period antiseptic and aseptic
surgery and radiology made the hospital for the first time indispensable to physicians
caring for both poor and well-to-do patients. This rapid growth of hospitals and
their use by paying patients resulted in a rapid growth in proprietary hospitals.
According to the National Hospital Record in i9o4,
Those who have kept in close contact with hospital growth in the United States
have not failed to note the rapid increase in hospitals established and owned by
individual physicians (e.g.) during its first year, the Morrison Hospital was a little
more than self sustaining, and thus far in its second year it is providing a very
satisfactory investment.7
During the late i89os, the National Hospital Record reported the sale of dozens of
proprietary hospitals from one owner to another, suggesting that there was a market
for such hospitals.
We know of no record of the number of proprietary hospitals before the AMA
started collecting such figures in 1927. However, a very rough estimate may be
possible. The Bureau of the Census, in its Benevolent Institutions zgo, lists 1918
hospitals, excluding hospitals "conducted on a distinctly business basis."8 For i909
the AMA reported 4359 hospitals including proprietary hospitals. If we can assume
The U.S. Bureau of Education study is discussed in M. LERNERE & 0. ANDERSON, Hr.L PRoorxss
in THE UNmED STATES, 900-i960, at 236 (x963). Approximately 40% of these hospitals were for the
insane.
6 127 J.A.M.A. 772, 776 (1945). The AMA made these surveys through 1945. The results of these
surveys are reflected in Table i infra, covering 1909-41 (all hospitals) and 1938-41 (proprietary hospitals).
7 8 NATIONAL HOSPITAL RECORD (1904). The data in Table i infra for total hospitals in x878 and
1903 can be found in 7 NATIONAL HosPITAL RECORD (1903). The X903 figure is admitted to be only
an approximation.
" U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENsus, BENEVOLENT INSTITUTIONS 1910 (1913).
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the difference between these two figures is accounted for by proprietary hospitals, then
they numbered about 2:z4 hospitals or about fifty-six per cent of total hospitals. This
figure must be viewed sceptically, but it is all we have to go on By 1928 Rorem
reported 2435 proprietary out of 6852 total hospitals (thirty-six per cent of all hos-
pitals).P This percentage figure has been declining fairly steadily to the present.
In 1968 proprietary hospitals accounted for io.8 per cent of all hospitals." The avail-
able trend data are set forth in Table i.
TABLE i
THEI CHANGING SHARE OF THE MARKET SERVED BY PROPRIETARY HosPITALs
Total Number Number of Proprietary Hospitals
of Hospitals Proprietary as a Percent of Total
Year of All Types Hospitals Hospitals
1873 ........................ 178
1878 ........................ 442
1903 ........................ 2500
1909 ........................ 4359
1910 ........................ 2441 (est.) 56% (est.)
1914 ........................ 5047
1918 ........................ 5323
1923 ........................ 6830
1928 ........................ 6852 2435 36%
1938 ........................ 6166 1681 27%
1941 ........................ 6358 1584 25%
1946 ........................ 6125 1076 18%
1950 ........................ 6788 1218 18%
1956 ........................ 6966 981 14%
1960 ........................ 6876 856 12%
1966 ........................ 7160 852 12%
1968 ........................ 7137 769 11%
Source.: Authorities cited notes 5-8, 10 & 11 supra.
Where data are available both the proprietary share of the short-term hospital market and the share of the market of proprietary
hospitals as measured by number of beds show the same declining trend over time. Different sources cite different numbers of hospitals
for the same year, making for some confusion in this literature. Defnitions have changed slightly over the years. There are particular
difficulties for the years 1945-50 when the AMA stopped listing hospitals and the AHA started.
After igio the growth in number of hospitals leveled off considerably. The trend
away from proprietary hospitals was evident to a few observers by I92O, as the
following editorial of that year suggests:
The head of a private (for profit) hospital in a Southwestern city recently asked
Hospital Management to publish an editorial dealing with the transition through
which many hospitals in that section are going.
When the country was new, and before the great prosperity that has come to
the Southwest increased wealth and population, the only available hospital facilities
were those provided by the physicians and surgeons themselves. It was obviously a
period when the private hospital was not only needed, but when it was the only
It may be close to impossible to obtain more accurate information for these years. Even an in-
depth study of one area would be inappropriate because of important regional differences. And looking
at the history of presently existing hospitals is also inadequate since many of the early proprietary hos-
pitals have disappeared.
o C. RoREM, THE PUBLIC'S INVESMEaNT IN HOSPITALS 14 (1930).
x' HOSPITALS (GUIDE IssuE), Aug. I, x969, pt. 2, at 474. This source provides the data for 1946-68.
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kind of hospital people could possibly get. Because communities lacked the money
and the public sentiment that make public hospitals possible the doctors established
and operated them as private institutions-through them rendered valuable service
to their communities.
Now many of the towns in the Southwest, notably Oklahoma and Texas, have
reached a point where they are in a position to establish community hospitals.
Their people are ready to support the work and are prepared to take over the
private hospitals which have been serving a useful and essential purpose.
That is what is happening. The hospital man referred to above has been asked
to allow his institution to become a nucleus around which a community hospital
may be built, and he has consented to the plan. His interest is in having hospital
facilities for his patients rather than having a hospital that he may call his own.
The situation is interesting in emphasizing the important work of the private
hospital and in showing how it is often the predecessor and forerunner of the
community hospital. The work done by the medical men who established private
hospitals when no other hospitals were available forms a commendable and in-
teresting chapter in the development of the American hospital fieldP
If we might generalize from the foregoing findings, the period 189o to igio saw a
rapid growth in demand for completely new hospitals for paying patients. In the
absence of an existing hospital, or in the face of a lack of community effort, pro-
prietary hospitals grew rapidly in number. As growth in the number of institutions
stabilized, the proprietary hospitals tended either to become nonprofit or close
down. Increases in demand since then have largely resulted in increases in the size
of existing hospitals rather than in the number of hospitals.
This gives a basis for the development of a model of the role of proprietary hos-
pitals which will be elaborated and further tested below."8
II
CURRENT CHARACTERISTICS OF PROPRIETARY HosPITALs
This section attempts to paint a statistical portrait of proprietary hospitals today.
Table 2 displays some of the major attributes of the three primary types of short-
term, general hospitals. Proprietary hospitals tend to be smaller than voluntary and
state and local governmental hospitals and lower in nearly every measure except
the excess of revenue over expense. Perhaps the most striking difference is in assets
per bed, where voluntary hospitals have, on average, over two and a half times the
assets per bed of proprietary hospitals.
" HOSPITAL MANAGEMENT, Feb. 1928, at 50.
1 it is beyond the scope of this paper to discuss the nursing home industry. Based on the his-
torical evidence for hospitals, one can speculate that the rapid growth of nursing homes in the last 30
years is analogous to the rapid growth of hospitals between IN8o and x91o. Nursing homes at present
are largely proprietary, a fact consistent with our model's suggestion that proprietary organizations adapt
more rapidly to new demand. One might predict that, once this demand has stabilized, nonprofit nursing
homes will have a larger share of the market. See Eagle, Nursing Homes and Related Facilities: A
Review of the Literature, 83 PuB. HEALTH REP. 673 (1968); Solon & Baney, Ownership and Sire o/
Nursing Homes, 70 Pu. HEAmTH REP. 437 (955); Earle, The Nursing Home Industry, HOSPITALS,
Feb. 16, 1970, at 45, ix6, Mar. 1, 1970, at 6o.
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TABLE 2
SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF NONFEDERAL, SHORT-TRM GENERAL AND
OTHER SPEcIAL HOSPITALS, 1968
State & Local
Characteristic Voluntary Proprietary Governmental
Mean Bed Size ....................... 165 62 118
Median Bed Size ...................... 115 47 89
Per cent Accredited ................... 81 47 55
Average Occupancy (%) ............... 80.0 73.9 73.9
Average Length of Stay (days) ......... 8.3 7.0 8.9
Average Full-Time Personnel
per 100 Patients .................... 276 237 270
Average Ratio of Payroll to
Total Expense (%) .................. 59.9 52.2 60.6
*Average Total Revenue per
Patient Day (1967) ................. 8 57.1 856.6 n. a.
*Average Total Expense per
Patient Day (1967) .................. S55.0 S51.9 $51.8
*Average Excess Revenue per
Patient Day (1967) .................. S2.1 $4.5 n. a.
Average Assets per Bed ................ $29,954 $11,229 822,323
Source: HosprrAs (GUIDE IssuE), Aug. 1, 169, pt. 2, at 475-500, Aug. 1, 1968, pt. 2, at 442, 454.
*Comparable data not available for 1968.
TABLE 3
PERCENTAGE OF HOSPITALS ACCREDITED BY THE JOINT COMImSSION ON
ACCREDITATION OF HOSPITALS, 1968*
Voluntary Hospitals Proprietary Hospitals
Size (Beds) Number % Accredited Number % Accredited
under 25 ................ 155 3.2 148 2.7
25-49 ................ 596 47.1 276 29.7
50-99 ................ 795 81.5 213 73.2
100-199 ............... 854 96.9 105 87.6
200-299 ............... 460 98.9 22 100.0
300 and over ........... 570 99.5 5 80.0
Totals ............... 3430 81.1 769 46.8
Source: HospnPra (GUIn Is=), Aug. 1, 1269, pt. 2, at 494.
*Hospitals reporting.
One must be very careful in drawing conclusions from Table 2 because many of the
apparent differences shown here between types of hospitals can be explained by
differences in mean hospital size as measured by the number of beds. Large hos-
pitals have generally higher occupancy, longer length of stay, a higher staffing ratio,
higher expense and revenue per patient day, and higher assets per bed. For ex-
ample, Table 3 demonstrates that, when size is controlled for, there is not too much
difference in the percentage of proprietary and nonproprietary hospitals which
are accredited. Accreditation is by the Joint Commission on Accreditation of
Hospitals and results from periodic inspections of participating hospitals to see if
they comply with the Commission's minimal standards of excellence. As such,
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TABLE 4
DISTRIBUTION OF NONFEDEItAL HOSPITALS BY BED SIZE, x968*
State & Local
Voluntary Proprietary Governmental
Size (Beds) Number % Number % Number %
under 25 ................... 155 4.5 148 19.2 142 8.8
25-49 .................. 596 17.4 276 35.9 523 32.3
50-99 .................. 795 23.2 213 27.7 469 28.9
100-199 .................. 854 24.9 105 13.7 273 16.8
200-299 .................. 460 13.4 22 2.9 84 5.2
300-399 .................. 291 8.5 39 2.4
400-499 .................. 141 4.1 5 0.7 28 1.7
500 and over .............. 138 4.0J 63 3.9
Total ................... 3430 100.0 769 100.0 1621 100.0
Interquartile Ranget
(number of beds): ......... 57-237 29-86 38-130
Source: Hospirr.A (Gu.nn Lam), Aug. 1, 1969, pt. 2, at 494. Totals may not b exact due to rounding.
*Hospitals reporting.
rThis is a simple measure of disperslon. Twenty-five per cent of the hospitals were smaller and 25% were larger than the range shownhere
TABLE 5
REGIONAL DISTRIBUTION OF NONFEDERAL, SHORT-TERm GENERAL AND
OT-m SPECImL HOSPITALS, 1968
% state &
Region % Voluntary % Proprietary Local Governmental
1 - New England ............. 87.5 3.4 9.1
2- Middle Atlantic ........... 78.7 10.9 10.4
3 - South Atlantic ............ 53.1 13.2 33.7
4 - East North Central ........ 75.6 1.9 22.5
5 - East South Central ........ 38.6 17.6 43.8
6 - West North Central ........ 62.3 3.2 34.5
7 - West South Central ........ 34.1 31.7 34.2
8 - Mountain ................ 59.7 5.1 35.2
9 - Pacific ................... 50.8 24.3 24.9
United States Total ........... 58.9 13.2 27.9
Soure: Hosprres (GumE Issuz), Aug. 1, 1969, pt, 2, at 480-91. Their definition of regions in used here.
it can be used for our purposes as an approximate measure of the quality of care
provided by a class of hospitals.
Table 4 gives the size distribution of the three classes of hospitals. Proprietary
hospitals tend to be, on average, about two-fifths the size of voluntary hospitals
and about one-half the size of state and local governmental hospitals. Proprietary
hospitals have the least dispersion in bed size and voluntary hospitals the most.
Table 5 gives the distribution of hospitals by geographical region. Proprietary
hospitals tend to be concentrated in certain areas of the country. In fact, nearly
two-thirds (sixty-four per cent) of proprietary hospitals are located in five states:
Texas, California, New York, Louisiana, and Tennessee. Ten states (including
five in New England) and the District of Columbia have no proprietary hospitals.
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TABLE 6
CHANGES IN SELECTED CHARACTERISTICS OF NONFEDERAL, SHORT-TERM GENERAL AND
OTHM SPECIAL HOSPITALS, 1960-1968
% Increase (Decrease)
State & Local
Characteristic Voluntary Proprietary Governmental
Total Hospitals ....................... 4.2 (10.2) 28.7
Total Beds ........................... 26.9 29.7 23.1
Mean Bed Size ....................... 21.3 44.2 (4.8)
Average Occupancy ................... 4.4 13.0 3.2
Average Length of Stay ............... 12.2 22.8 1.1
Average Total Expense per Patient
Day .............................. 87.1 79.1 104.7
Average Assets per Bed ................ 58.6 71.0 58.9
Bourc: Hosprrs (GumE Issur), Aug. 1, 1969, p.. 2, at 475.
One can only speculate on these wide regional and state differences. Perhaps they
are due in part to differing regional preferences which occurred in the past and
have been perpetuated into the present, and in part to differing taxation and licensure
policies at the state and local level. They may also be due to regional differences
in factors influencing the "market" for short-term hospital care which will be dis-
cussed later.
Thus far, the description of proprietary hospitals has been a static one. Table
6 shows some changes in characteristics of short-term hospitals that have occurred
in recent years. In the nine-year interval recorded, the total number of proprietary
hospitals has decreased about ten per cent while the total number of proprietary
beds has increased nearly thirty per cent. The mean bed size of proprietary hos-
pitals has increased over twice as much as that of voluntary hospitals, while state
and local governmental hospitals have actually decreased in average bed size. The
large increases in average occupancy and average length of stay in proprietary
hospitals reflect the relatively low averages for these measures in 196o (65.4 per cent
and 5.7 days). It is interesting to note that all the characteristics of proprietary
hospitals measured here, with the exception of total expense per patient day, have
been moving closer to the means of these measures for voluntary hospitals. This
is suggestive that hospitals are becoming more homogeneous, but it is certainly not
conclusive.
Table 7 illustrates one aspect of proprietary hospitals which has not been
mentioned heretofore, namely the relative frequency with which proprietary hos-
pitals enter into and exit from the acute care marketplace. In 1968, proprietary
hospitals accounted for 13.2 per cent of all short-term general hospitals, yet from
1966 to 1968, fifty-nine per cent of all the hospitals that closed were proprietary.
Similarly, thirty-seven per cent of the hospitals that opened were proprietary.
The volatility of the proprietary hospital market goes hand in hand with their
relatively low average bed size and assets per bed. Since proprietary have on
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TABLE 7
CLOSuRES AND OPENINGS OF NONFEDERAL SHORT-TERM GENERAL AND OTHER
SPECIAL HOSPITALS, 1962-1968
State & Local
Voluntary Proprietary Governmental Total
Hospitals Closed .............. 247 561 146 954
Per cent of Total Closed ....... 26% 59% 15% 100%
Per cent of Hospitals of the
Same Type Existing in
1968* ...................... 7% 73% 9% n.a.
Hospitals Opened, 1962-1968
(est.) ....................... 393 476 423 1292
Per cent of Total Opened ....... 30% 37% 33% 100%
Per cent of Hospitals of the
Same Type Existing in
1968* ...................... 12% 62% 26% na.
Sour.: Hosprrmis (GumE Issue), Aug. 1,1969, Et. 2, at 475; AHA Bureau ofResearch Staristis, Trends in Hospital Mergers, Closurej,
and Services, tables 9 & 10, Aug. 5, 1968 unpublished document).
*This statistic is intended to give a rough idea of the magnitude of closure or opening with respect to the absoluto hospital clam size
.(&g., the number of proprietary hospitals that closed from 1962 to 1968 is 73% of the total number of proprietary hospitals that existed
in 1068).
average about two-fifths the beds of voluntary hospitals and two-fifths the assets
per bed, the typical proprietary hospital has less than one-sixth the total assets per
hospital of a typical voluntary hospital. Entry into and exit from the marketplace
involves the purchase and sale of far fewer assets.14 In short, proprietary hospitals
are much more easily adaptable to changes in the market for acute hospital care.
This conclusion is certainly consistent with the historical role of the proprietary
hospital discussed previously. Tables 8-io focus more closely on proprietary hos-
pitals alone.
Table 8 shows some of the results of our study of all the short-term proprietary
hospitals of record in 196o and their status in 1967. New proprietary hospitals-
those that existed in 1967 but did not exist in i96o-were also recorded. All pro-
prietary hospitals that opened after 196o but closed or otherwise changed their
status (became voluntary, for example) were not considered.
The hospitals are listed by increasing complexity of proprietary ownership,
with single ownership as the least complex. The five possible outcomes of these
hospitals were (i) to remain the same; (ii) and (iii) to change to one of the two
other forms of proprietary ownership; 5 (iv) to close; or (v) to become voluntary.
The results shown in Table 8 are summarized below:
(i) Singly-owned hospitals had the highest proportion that dosed (fifty-one
per cent) and the lowest proportion that became voluntary (four per cent).
" The principal also applies to hospitals of equal size. Richard L. Johnson has estimated that the
cost of construction was nearly three times as great for a "typical" ioo-bed voluntary hospital as for a
"typical" proprietary hospital of the same size. R. Johnson, Capital Financing of Proprietary Hospitals,
x967 (unpublished manuscript).
'" Thus a singly-owned hospital could pass to partnership or corporate status; a corporate-owned hos-
pital could become singly- or partnership-owned; and a partnership operation could pass to a single
owner or to corporate form.
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TABLE 8
OWNERSHIP CHANGES FOR PROPRIETARY HoSPITALS, i96o-i967
Ownership in 1967
Single For-Profit Became
Owner Partnership Corporation Closed Voluntary Total
Ownership in
1960: number % number % number % number % number % number %
Single Owner 60 12 33 120 9 23426 5 14 51 4 (100)
Partnership 6 88 20 84 14 2123 41 9 40 7 (100)
Corporation 5 8 282 85 55 4351 2 65 19 13 (100)
Total hospitals 71 108 335 289 77 881
existing in 1960 8 12 38 33 9 (100)
Hospitals 33 50 240 323
opened since 16 19 74 (100)
1960 - - -
Total all 104 158 575 837
hospitals in 12 19 69 (100)
existence in
1967 1
Soure: HOSPrrALs (GUIDE Isscu), Aug. 1, 1961, pt. 2, Aug. 1, 1968, pL 2. Alaska and Hawaii are excluded.
Corporate-owned hospitals had the lowest proportion that closed (nineteen per
cent) and the highest proportion that became voluntary (thirteen per cent). Part-
nership-owned hospitals were in the middle on both counts (forty per cent closed
and seven per cent became voluntary).
(2) Very few hospitals reverted toward a "lower" level of ownership. Table 8
shows that only three per cent of partnership-owned hospitals reverted to single
ownership, and only one per cent of corporate-owned hospitals reverted to a single
owner and two per cent to a partnership. Singly-owned hospitals had the smallest
proportion that remained the same (twenty-eight per cent) while the corporate-
owned category had the highest (sixty-five per cent). Partnership-owned hospitals
were in the middle (forty-one per cent).
(3) Of the 88i proprietary hospitals existing in i960, thirty-three per cent had
closed and nine per cent had become voluntary by 1967. Therefore, fifty-eight
per cent of proprietary hospitals in i96o were still proprietary in 1967.
(4) In 196o, twenty-seven per cent of proprietary hospitals were singly-owned,
twenty-four per cent were partnership-owned, and forty-nine per cent were corporate-
owned. The corresponding figures for 1967 (including new proprietary hospitals)
were twelve, nineteen, and sixty-nine per cent, respectively. Thus there is a pro-
nounced trend toward corporate ownership of proprietary hospitals.
(5) The data suggest a stepwise trend from single owner and partnership to for-
profit corporation-and finally to voluntary corporation. Singly- and partnership-
owned hospitals are more likely to become corporation-owned hospitals than
voluntary hospitals. Corporation-owned hospitals are by far the most likely to
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become voluntary-thirteen as opposed to five per cent for the other two types
combined; if one considers only those hospitals which did not dose, the corre-
sponding figures are sixteen and nine per cent, respectively.
These data do not measure the dynamics of the proprietary hospitals market-
place between i96o and 1967. For example, a hospital that entered as singly-
owned in, say, 1963 and became corporate-owned in 1966 would be listed as enter-
ing as a corporation. A hospital that was listed as singly-owned in i96o which
became a corporation in 1965 and a voluntary hospital in 1967 would be listed
simply as a singly-owned hospital that became voluntary. A hospital that entered
as a corporation in 1965 and became voluntary in 1967 would not be recorded at all.
Although these dynamic interim effects have not been recorded, one can obtain
an idea as to their magnitude if Table 7 is reconsidered. The AHA Bureau of
Research Statistics reported that between 1962 and 1968 a total of 561 proprietary
hospitals dosed.16 Table 8 shows that of the proprietary hospitals existing in i96o,
289 had closed by 1967. Aside from the fact that slightly different time periods
are used, the difference between these two figures should be explained by the
fact that the data expressed in Table 7 measure the interim effects, while the data
expressed in Table 8 do not." Thus a proprietary hospital that was opened in
1963 and closed in 1966 would be recorded in Table 7 but not in Table 8. These
data suggest that Table 8 conceals some of the activity in ownership change of
proprietary hospitals.
The relationship between change in type of proprietary hospital ownership and
change in average size (in beds) is presented in Tables 9 and io. The data in these
tables are summarized below:
(i) Although the total number of proprietary hospitals declined by five per
cent, the number of corporate-owned proprietary hospitals increased by thirty-two
per cent. The percentage of decline in individually-owned hospitals was over twice
as great as that in the number of partnership-owned hospitals. The trend toward
corporate ownership of proprietary hospitals is clearly established.
(2) In 1967 as in i96o, corporate-owned proprietary hospitals had the highest
average bed size and singly-owned hospitals the lowest. In both years the average
size of corporate hospitals was over twice as great as that of individually-owned
hospitals.
(3) Each type of proprietary hospital increased in average size (as measured
by the number of beds) from i96o to 1967, with partnership-owned hospitals in-
18 AHA Bureau of Research Statistics, Trends in Hospital Mergers, Closures, and Services, Aug. 5,
1968 (unpublished document).
"
7 One cannot dismiss the possibility that the difference is also largely due to the vagaries of data
collection. The AHA Bureau of Research Statistics did not report a source for its data on hospital
closures, but presumably it used the same data base from which the Guide Issues are compiled. If this
is so, tables 7 and 8, supra, should be consistent and comparable. Interestingly, the Bureau reported
that of all proprietary hospital closures between 1962 and x968, 34% occurred in x965, a year considered
in both tables.
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TABLE 9
CHANGE IN OWNERSHIP OF PROPRIETARY HOSPITALS, 196o-1967
1960 1967 Percentage
Change
Type of Ownership Number Percentage Number Percentage in Number
Single Owner .......... 234 27 104 12 -56
Partnership........... 212 24 158 19 -25
Corporation........... 435 49 575 69 32
Total ................. 881 100 837 100 -5
Source: Data presented in Table 8.
TABLE io
CHANGE IN AVERAGE SIZE (NUmm OF BEDS) OF PROPRIETARY HOSPITALS,
T960-T967
Average Size
Percentage
Type of Ownership 1960 1967 Increase
Single Owner ............................. 26.1 30.4 16
Partnership .............................. 34.1 57.6 69
Corporation .............................. 58.0 65.2 12
Total .................................... 43.8 59.4 36
Proprietary hospitals that closed by 1967 .... 30.5 - -
Proprietary hospitals that became voluntary
by 1967 ............................... 56.3 67.0 19
All nonfederal short-term general and
other special hospitals ................... 118.2 134.7 14
Source: Hosprrsa (Gurm IssE), Aug. 1, 1961, pt. 2, Aug. 1, 1968, pt. 2.
creasing by the greatest percentage. Due to the general trend toward higher average
size and the fact that many singly- and partnership-owned hospitals moved into
the higher average size corporation class, the average size of all proprietary hos-
pitals increased by thirty-six per cent. By comparison, the average size increase for all
nonfederal, short-term general and other special hospitals was only fourteen per
cent.
(4) The average size of proprietary hospitals existing in 1966 that had closed
by 1967 was 30.5 beds. This figure compares with an average size of about sixty
beds for all short-term hospitals (including federal) that dosed between 1962 and
196801
Not shown in Table io is the fact that the average sizes for proprietary hos-
pitals that closed and for those that became voluntary were highest for corporate-
owned hospitals and lowest for individually-owned hospitals, with partnership-
owned hospitals in the middle in both cases.
"
8 This figure is estimated from data presented in Trends in Hospital Mergers, Closures, and Services,
supra note 16, table 6.
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One final analysis was performed in order to gain further insight into the
proprietary role in the market for acute hospital care. Readings were taken from
196 and 1968 Guide Issues on the ratio of proprietary hospital beds to all non-
federal, short-term general and other special hospital beds for each of forty-eight
states for the years i96o and 1967. A regression equation was estimated with the
change in the proportion of proprietary beds to total beds as the dependent vari-
able (Y). Several variables were tried as independent, the most satisfactory of
which were the ratio of growth of population by state (X1) and the proportion of
growth in per capita income by state (X2). The equation derived is given below :1
Y = .oo- -.+ Xl -- 0.o93X2
t-values (4.084) (-3.135) r2 = 0.495
The coefficient of determination (r2) of .495 means that nearly half of the vari-
ation in the proportion of proprietary beds to total beds by state is explained by
variations in the proportionate changes in population and per capita income. The
positive sign of the coefficient of X, means that increases in the ratio of proprietary
beds to total beds are highest in states where population has increased the most.
The negative sign of the coefficient of X 2 indicates that increases in the ratio of
proprietary beds to total beds are highest in states where per capita income has
increased the least.
To interpret this regression equation, one should bear in mind that we have
considered only the proportionate changes in the measures considered and not their
absolute levels. The positive relationship between population change and change
in market share is clear cut. Proprietary hospitals have proliferated where the
demand for hospital beds, as approximated by population growth, has outstripped
the capacity of the nonprofit system to accommodate the increase in demand. The
negative relationship between growth in per capita income and change in market
share is less obvious. Our interpretation is that proprietary hospital beds tend to
proliferate where there has been inadequate financing of capital expansion through
the voluntary system. Perhaps this condition is most likely to exist in states where
per capita income growth has been lowest. A related consideration is that since
proprietary hospital beds require the formation of much less capital than nonprofit
hospital beds, states in which income has increased the least are less likely to con-
centrate on the more expensive type of facility.
In the light of these data and experiments one can postulate a partial and tenta-
19 The variables were defined in the following manner:
= proprietary beds, 1967 proprietary beds, 196o
total beds, x967 total beds, 196o
population, 1967 - population, 196o
xl -" population, 196o
per capita income, 1967- per capita income, 196o
X2 per capita income, 196o
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tive model of the role of proprietary hospitals in the market for acute hospital care.
We have observed that proprietary hospitals constitute a "marginal" operation;
marginal with respect to their small share of the market, their small average
bed size, their quick entry and exit from the marketplace, and a variety of other
factors. Certainly, the market is heavily dominated by nonprofit hospitals, and this
is reflected by the apparent fact that most public policy in the hospital area seems
to be formulated with the nonprofit hospital specifically in mind. This predominance
of voluntarism occurs in an economy that depends primarily on the profit motive
for the organization of production in nearly all other industries. Economist Kenneth
Arrow notes that apparent anomaly in the following terms:
Departure from the profit motive is strikingly manifested by the overwhelming
predominance of nonprofit over proprietary hospitals.... The simplest explanation
is that public and private subsidies decrease the cost to the patient in nonprofit
hospitals. A second possibility is that the association of profit-making with the
supply of medical services arouses suspicion and antagonism on the part of
patients and referring physicians, so they do prefer nonprofit institutions. Either
explanation implies a preference on the part of some group, whether donors [sic] or
patients, against the profit motive in the supply of hospital services.2
Given this apparent disdain for proprietary hospitals and its manifestations
(especially in the area of taxation), why do proprietary hospitals persist? To
answer this question one must examine the motives behind the construction and
operation of individual proprietary hospitals. The literature suggests that these
hospitals are most often created for one of two primary reasons: (i) Individual
entrepreneurs have perceived the attractiveness of a proprietary hospital as a profit-
able investment venture in communities in which, for a variety of reasons, non-
profit hospitals have not satisfied the demand for acute hospital care; or (2) in-
dividual doctors or small groups of doctors have become dissatisfied with the lack
of availability of beds for admitting their private patients and have responded by
financing the construction of their own proprietary hospitals.
In some parts of the country, such as New York City, it is widely believed that
proprietary hospitals exist there because many doctors have been unable to obtain
admitting privileges at the often more prestigious voluntary hospitals. Some argue
that they have not been granted privileges at voluntary hospitals because they are
less competent, while others argue that discrimination has been a factor. The
former argument has led to the belief that doctors affiliated with proprietary hos-
pitals are less competent and that, therefore, the quality of care at these hospitals is
not as good.
Both of these explanations imply failure on the part of nonprofit hospitals to
accommodate changes in the demand for acute hospital care. In a world where
demand was stable or entirely predictable we might expect proprietary hospitals
20 Arrow, Uncertainty and the Welfare Economics of Medical Care, 53 Am. ECON. REv. 941, 950
(x963) (footnotes omitted).
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to die out entirely. The data have shown that proprietary hospitals tend to close
or become voluntary where communities have stabilized and the demands for acute
hospital care have become relatively known. But, where such conditions have not
been present, proprietary hospitals have taken advantage of their ability to enter
quickly into the market place in response to changing conditions affecting the
demand for acute hospital care. In short, the flexibility of the proprietary hospital
operation has contributed to its ability to compete in a market dominated by non-
profit hospitals.
The above "model" of proprietary hospital operation tends to be supported by
the data. It assigns a role to proprietary hospitals that is more complementary than
competitive with respect to the nonprofit sector. Proprietary hospitals are seen to
act as a buffer to the dominant mode of nonprofit operation, taking up the peaks
and troughs of a capricious demand for acute hospital care 1 This role of pro-
prietary hospitals will be discussed more fully in the next section of the paper, which
attempts to summarize the salient issues and trends that involve the profit motive
in the hospital industry.
III
IssuEs
Of the many issues relevant to proprietary hospitals only a few will be discussed
here. These are professional ideology, proprietary chains, selective admissions (called
"cream-skimming"), and proprietary versus voluntary hospitals.
A. Ideology
In a country committed to competitive capitalism, why are not all hospitals
proprietary? This inquiry soon takes us into questions far from the core of our
paper, but a brief comment may be useful.
The underlying assumption of the professions is that they consist of highly trained
experts. It follows that the public is ignorant and unable to choose wisely in the
professional's area of competence. The professional is expected to make decisions
for the unknowing consumer. If the professional is not to abuse this trust, he must
be motivated by a high ethical standard rather than the crass pursuit of the dollar.
Furthermore, the client's freedom of choice is restricted since lower-quality, "cut-
rate" services are not provided, even if there is revealed a significant demand for this
type of service.
Conversely, the free market and the profit motive assume that the consumer is the
best evaluator of his purchases, and the seller is not expected to adhere to a high
ethical standard except insofar as his own interests are promoted. The professional
"
1 The relatively small share of the market held by proprietary hospitals suggests that these peaks
and troughs are proportionally rather small in this industry. They are rather large in the drug in-
dustry, and this may explain why the latter industry is dominated by for-profit firms.
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provides what the public "needs" while the competitive marketplace provides what
the customer "demands."
Given this philosophy of professionalism in medicine, nonprofit status becomes
the preferred type of ownership for hospitals because it places ethical service above
profits and it results in a vehicle for providing for patient's "needs" rather than
being subservient to consumer "demands." In addition, the existence of profits is
often viewed as a detraction from the amount of vital health services received for
every dollar spent. This effect is magnified by the critical, "life-or-death" nature
of the product in the acute hospital care industry. One might alternatively view
the existence of profits as evidence of the satisfaction of consumer wants, but this
is not the dominant view of the health care industries, except for, perhaps, the case
of the individual medical practitioner.
Proprietary hospitals must surmount this ideologically derived distaste for the
profit motive in order to reverse the trend toward their disappearance. The his-
torical role of proprietary hospitals is often condoned by the professional elements
of the industry on the grounds that they existed primarily where there were no
nonprofit hospitals to fulfill community needs. In fact, we have shown that many
such hospitals were conceived and operated by the professionals themselves. How-
ever, as proprietary hospitals increasingly attempt to enter into direct competition
with their nonprofit counterparts, as is sometimes the case with the multi-facility
chains, the stigma of the profit motive becomes clearly and volubly expressed.
B. The For-Profit Hospital Chains2 2
The recent development of publicly owned, for-profit corporations owning a chain
of hospitals (and perhaps other health facilities such as nursing homes and labora-
tories as well) has been of interest to many because of their spectacular and volatile
stock market performance. Stock prices of these corporations rose sharply in 1968
and 1969, so that many were selling at price-to-earnings ratios of ioo or more. By
1970, these prices fell sharply, even below their initial offering prices, and more
sharply than the stock market as a whole.
As of i97o there were twenty-nine different chains owning two or more hospitals.
The largest two were American Medicorp, Inc., with thirty-one hospitals, and Hos-
pital Corporation of America, with twenty-three hospitals. These twenty-nine
corporations owned a total of 207 hospitals in 1970.
The growth of these chains has primarily occurred through the acquisition of
existing proprietary hospitals in exchange for stock in the chain. Given the
spectacular rise in prices of these stocks, this transaction must have been appealing
to existing owners, thus spurring the rapid growth of the chains. As most of the
potentially profitable existing proprietary hospitals have now either been purchased
by a chain or have declined to sell, this form of growth will probably play a less
22 The data in this section is largely derived from Study of For-Profit Hospital Chains, supra note 4,
but the interpretation is our own.
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important role in the future. Mark Levitan, an official of American Medicorp, sees
their future efforts as concentrated in building new hospitals in new and growing
communities rather than in purchasing existing hospitals.2
It is too early to tell how important a role these chains will play in the hospital
industry. They are currently in a transition period reflected by the recent decline
in their stock prices and by the end of the period of growth through the acquisition
of existing proprietary hospitals. Thus their future is uncertain. Given our model,
one might predict a continued existence for the chains as they fill the traditional
role of proprietary hospitals, rapidly adapting to shifts in demand. One would expect
to observe their future expansion through building new hospitals in rapidly grow-
ing middle-class communities. Our model would predict neither their disappearance
nor their capturing of an enormous share of the total hospital market. To this
extent, these chains do not represent a "break in the data" or a departure from
our model.
To the extent that the chains have been transforming single-owner and partner-
ship-owned hospitals into corporate-owned hospitals they fit our model. However,
the chains may block the final step in the progression should they prove reluctant
to turn their largest hospitals over to nonprofit corporations.
The concept of a chain of hospitals within a single corporation is not new. The
Veterans Administration hospitals, numerous Catholic orders, and other religious
groups own chains of not-for-profit hospitals. The for-profit chains argue that
there are economies of scale to be achieved through such combinations. However,
the efficiency of the above-mentioned nonprofit chains has not been noticeably
greater than that of individual voluntary hospitals, which use consultants, planning
groups, and regional hospital associations as a substitute for the staff skills that can
be performed by the corporate headquarters of a chain.
The for-profit chains are new in that they are not totally owned by physicians,
as has been the case overwhelmingly with the other proprietary hospitals. A po-
tential benefit of this public ownership is the ability to raise capital through
issuance of equity shares or convertible bonds. Other than this, these for-profit
chains are merely a new combination of old ingredients (multiple ownership, for-
profit status), and it remains to be seen if the sum is greater than the parts.
C. "Cream-Skimming"
The most serious indictment of proprietary hospitals is contained in the argument
that has been labeled "cream-skimming." The essence of the cream-skimming argu-
ment is that proprietary hospitals can and do profit by concentrating on providing
the most profitable services to the best-paying patients, thereby skimming the cream
of the market for acute hospital care and leaving the remainder to nonprofit
hospitals.
23 Personal communication to the authors.
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There are two basic types of cream-skinming. First, with regard to the range
of services offered, proprietary hospitals allegedly eliminate, wherever possible, the
more expensive and less heavily utilized services which tend to be unprofitable to most
hospitals, such as emergency and outpatient departments, pediatric and obstetric
units, and cardiac care units. Data support the belief that proprietary hospitals,
on average, offer fewer services than nonprofit hospitals, although the differences
are reduced when only hospitals of similar size are considered 4
Second, proprietary hospitals are accused of skimming the cream by excluding so
far as possible patients with complex illnesses who require expensive and time-
consuming treatment and patients who do not pay their full charges-such as Med-
icare, Medicaid, the uninsured, and most welfare patients. Most of this selecting is
accomplished simply by locating the hospital in a relatively well-to-do area and by
exercising some control over the admitting practices of the medical staff.
Critics of proprietary hospitals have stated that only by skimming the cream
are proprietary hospitals able to compete successfully with their nonprofit counter-
parts. Hospitals, it is argued, in order to meet the needs of the community must
offer a whole range of services, including some which are inherently unprofitable,
to all the local populace, regardless of a patient's ability to pay. If the proprietary
hospital can exclude unprofitable services and patients, it can then use slightly lower
prices or added convenience to attract the profitable patients. This poses a serious
threat to competing nonprofit hospitals, because they are deprived of many of their
best sources of revenue.
The cream-skimming argument implies that the traditional rate structures of
nonprofit hospitals have been set without correspondence to costs. In a com-
petitively stable industry price will equal economic costs (when investment returns
are considered an element of cost).
The fact that there are some goods and services in the hospital industry and some
types of patients which are "profitable" and some which are not strongly implies
a system of price discrimination whereby some patients are overcharged for their
hospital care and some are undercharged. The cream-skimming controversy serves
to illustrate the existence of noncompetitive conditions in the hospital industry
today. The multi-product, multi-service nature of the hospital industry, with the
infusion of a myriad of different types of third-party payers, makes pricing ex-
tremely difficult for the typical hospital. Nevertheless, if certain types of services
are consistently and identifiably overcharged for, nonprofit hospitals have good
reason to fear competition from proprietary hospitals.
The attitude of opponents of proprietary hospitals is that such hospitals have no
right to rob the nonprofit hospitals of their profitable patients and should be re-
strained from cream-skimming practices. They further argue that any hospital,
regardless of its ownership status, has an intrinsic obligation to its community to
2' Johnson, supra note 14; Study of For-Profit Hospital Chains, supra note 4-
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offer a full range of services to all patients irrespective of their ability to pay.P
Defendants of proprietary hospitals, after stating that services are not limited as
much as is generally believed, argue that to eliminate cream-skimming practices
would restrict both competition and the potential for competition and would reduce
the patient's freedom of choice. They further argue that many hospital services are
unprofitable primarily because they are underutilized and that proprietary hospitals'
provision of such services would amount to unnecessary duplication. With regard to
paying for indigent patients, proprietary hospitals claim that, as taxpayers, they
should not be required to perform this welfare function and that it is unfair to expect
a hospital to provide any service without compensation or at a price lower than its cost.
The cream-skimming controversy has serious implications for policy makers
in the area of health care services. Why have voluntary, nonprofit hospitals found
it necessary to set rates such that some services are profitable and others un-
profitable? In the hospital industry, the individual nonprofit hospital has typically
acted as both the arbiter and provider of many measures designed to affect the com-
munity's welfare with respect to health. As some services have been regarded as
"needed" but too expensive for community members to pay full cost, such services
have been underpriced, and, in the case of some medically indigent patients, services
have been provided without charge. Deficits for provision of these services have
been recovered in part by charging at above cost for the simpler services rendered
to patients with less complicated illnesses. This process effects a redistribution of
income in favor of the very sick and the inadequately insured at the expense of
other hospital patients. Due to broad levels of insurance coverage, this redistribution
of income is translated into increased insurance premiums paid by ill and healthy
persons alike. It is argued by many economists that this type of decision on the
redistribution of income should be performed at some level of government rather
than through price discrimination by providers of service.
It is easy to see that widespread competition from proprietary hospitals might
jeopardize the nonprofit hospital's pricing structure. This does not necessarily im-
ply, however, that cream-skimming practices by proprietary hospitals should be pro-
hibited. It is by no means clear that discriminatory pricing at the individual hospital
level is a desirable method of implementing public policy in the area of health.
For one thing, such a system is fragmented and lacks centralized control over the
degree and direction of implementation of welfare measures. Also, the potentially
salutary effects of competition cannot be disregarded. On the other hand, this type
of competition may require new forms of financing for unprofitable hospital services
and uninsured patients. Certainly, the resolution of the cream-skimming controversy
is a perplexing problem for policy makers and providers of hospital care alike.
"For a discussion of the hospital's duty to serve, see Cantor, The Law and Poor People's Access to
Health Care, in this symposium, p. 9oi.
Tim ROLE OF THE PROPRIETARY HOSPITAL
D. Proprietary Versus Voluntary Hospitals
Why do proprietary hospitals become voluntary? How do the two types compare
in performance? We have discussed the proprietary's more rapid adaptation to
fluctuating demand, the apparent preference on the part of the public for nonprofit
hospitals,26 and the ideological preference for them on the part of professionals.
Other reasons include opposition to proprietary hospitals by licensing agencies,
Blue Cross, and regional hospital planning agencies. This opposition is hard to
document, because it would appear through unwritten administrative decisions
rather than by legislation or any explicit written policy. '
An exhaustive study of these restrictions has not been carried out. One of the
few states with legal restrictions is New York,2 where proprietary hospitals may be
operated by single owners or partnerships but not by a corporation (including
chains). This law, in effect, does not allow the natural progression which occurs
elsewhere to take place. These administrative practices and legal restrictions are,
in a sense, artificial in that there is no compelling natural reason why they should
exist.
Another reason for favoring the voluntary hospital is the availability of charitable
contributions and the services of volunteer workers. It is not clear how important the
effect of charity is here. Firs% the proportion of hospital costs covered by charity has
been declining throughout this century. If charity is important in favoring the not-
for-profit hospital, then one would expect to see a historical trend jusb the reverse of
that shown in Table i. If charity was more important fifty years ago, there would
have been proportionally more voluntary hospitals then than now. Second, it may
be possible for proprietary hospitals to set up not-for-profit corporations with over-
lapping boards of directors for the receipt of charitable funds-for example, a non-
profit research institute or clinic. And there appears to be no reason why proprietary
hospitals cannot use volunteers. Finally, there are the tax advantages accruing to
nonprofit corporations, particularly in the form of exemptions from real estate taxes.
These may be large and important, but there is no compelling reason why these
advantages could not be extended to proprietary hospitals.
To some extent the future of proprietary hospitals will depend on their power
to influence planning bodies and lobby effectively for favorable legislation, since
legislation is the most likely source of disturbance in the progression suggested by
our model.
We have attempted to show that proprietary hospitals "behave" in ways which
nonprofit hospitals do not-for example, their greater adaptability to fluctuations
"one indicator of public preference for the nonprofit hospital is the degree to which proprietary
hospitals make an effort to disguise their for-profit status and "masquerade" as nonprofit institutions.2 Limited evidence does exist, however. In a study of eight standard metropolitan statistical areas,
J. Joel May found that, from X952 to z963, in areas with hospital planning agencies, proprietary hospital
beds decreased 54%, whereas in areas without such agencies, proprietary beds increased 222%. J. MAY,
HALTH PLAN1NG: Irs PAst AND PorNT 63 (967)-
"
8 N.Y. PuB. HEALTH LAw § 28oi-a (McKinney Supp. 1970).
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in demand. Conversely, voluntary hospitals perform in ways which proprietary
hospitals do not. They are more likely to accept indigent patients; they are more
heavily involved in scientific research; and they are more involved in teaching in-
terns, residents, medical students, nurses, and other ancillary professional personnel
and in the use of new and complex equipment and treatment techniques. Part
of these differences can be accounted for by hospital size. Part can be accounted
for by the fact that there is no "paying public" who "buy" enough of these services
to make them profitable. Proprietary hospitals, to the extent that they are compelled
by the profit motive, will take on these activities only to the exent that they are
profitable.2 9
Which type of hospital is more efficient, and which type has the highest quality
of care?"0 The major argument of the proprietary hospitals is that the profit motive
provides an incentive for efficiency which does not exist in the voluntary hospital.
Opponents argue that the proprietaries make a profit by reducing quality of care
and exploiting public ignorance. Efficiency and quality of care are extremely difficult
to measure, and so conclusions must be tentative.
If one is willing to accept the Darwinian assumption of survival of the fittest,
then the proprietary hospital's declining share of the market suggests its relative
inefficiency. 1 Moreover, there is a consensus that there are economies of scale for
up to 25o beds and perhaps beyond. The small average size of proprietary hospitals82
implies that individual proprietary hospitals have less opportunity to realize economies
of scale and are therefore comparatively inefficient.
There is also a consensus that, on the average, quality of care increases with
hospital size.P The is in part due to the wider scope of services and the range of
technical personnel that larger hospitals tend to have. This size effect is also
reflected in the fact that small hospitals are far less likely to be accredited by the
Joint Commission on Accreditation of Hospitals.84 To the extent that this is true,
the proprietary hospitals, being, on the average, smaller, will provide a lower quality
of care.
If one controls for the effect of size, then these differences are much less. Table
3 shows that, controlling for size, proprietary hospitals have almost the same chance
11 Note that for-profit and voluntary hospitals thus innovate in quite different ways. The proprietary
hospital and the chains adapt to new demands, while the voluntary hospitals are more likely to
support scientific research and pioneer in the use of new treatment techniques and equipment.
80 The concepts are generally given separate consideration in the hospital field, and we will follow
this convention. Efficiency usually refers to costs per unit of service (for example, cost per patient day),
controlling for differences in the type of service provided, while quality of care is generally discussed
without reference to costs.
81 See table i supra. For a more complete defense of the "survivorship principle," see Stigler, The
Economies of Scale, x J. L.,w. & EcoN. 54 (1958).
"
5 See table 2 supra.
" For a review of the literature on efficiency, quality of care, and hospital size, see D. Neuhauser &
R. Anderson, Structural Comparative Studies of Hospitals, paper presented at the Conference on Hospital
Intraorganizational Research, Ann Arbor, Mich., May 22, 1970.
8
'See table 3 supra.
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TABLE ii
MEAN EXPENSE PER INPATIENT DAY FOR COMMUNITY HOSPITALS
IN 1968
For-Profit For-Profit
Number of Beds Nonprofit Chain Nonchain
$ 8 $
under 50 ............................. 44.73 60.78 51.55
50 - 99 ............................. 47.64 67.73 52.42
100- 199 ............................ 55.23 66.20 46.77
200 and over ........................... 67.44 58.72 56.33
Total Number of Hospitals .............. 5051 153 616
.Source: Study of For-Profit Hospitals Chains, supra note 4, at 28. They used (Guide Issue data for community hospitals for 1968.
There is probably a greater nonresponse rate for proprietary than voluntary hospitals.
of being accredited as do nonprofit institutions. Moreover, with such a control, there
is no adequate empirical evidence comparing efficiency in proprietary and volun-
tary hospitals. The only information we have is a breakdown in Table ii of costs
per patient day for voluntary and for-profit community hospitals, and these results
are quite surprising. Under ioo beds voluntary hospitals are less costily, and over
2oo beds proprietary hospitals are less costly. The "over-2oo-bed" category may well
be pointing up differences in the scope of services provided-the large voluntary
hospitals having more services and, therefore, being more costly. The other sur-
prising aspect of this table is that the chains have higher average costs than the
nonchain proprietaries05 It would be unwise to draw any conclusions from this
table other than to say that it is not at all clear that proprietary hospitals are more
or less efficient than voluntary hospitals when size is controlled for.
CONCLUSION
We have attempted to describe the role of proprietary hospitals, showing that
they are more adaptable than nonprofit hospitals to rapid changes in demand from
paying patients. Once established, the proprietary hospital tends either to close or
to progress from ownership by a single owner or partnership to ownership by a
for-profit corporation and then to become a not-for-profit corporation.
As a result, the share of the hospital market held by the proprietaries will in part
depend on how volatile this demand is. Because proprietary hospitals are, on the
average, smaller than voluntary hospitals they do not achieve economies of scale.
Controlling for size, it is not clear whether proprietary hospitals are more or less
efficient than voluntary hospitals or that they provide better or worse quality of care.
It appears, given stable demand, that voluntary hospitals have some inherent ad-
vantages, including professional and public preference, and provide a superior
vehicle for teaching and research. The voluntary hospitals also have some ad-
30 Of the hospitals under ioo beds among the sample shown in table Ii, proprietary chain hospitals
are most likely to be accredited, nonchain proprietaries are least likely to be accredited, and voluntary
hospitals rank in the middle. Study of For-Profit Hospital Chains, supra note 4, at 28.
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vantages which are not inherent, such as paying no taxes, receiving charitable con-
tributions, and having many administrative decisions made in their favor by plan-
ning agencies, licensing authorities, Blue Cross, and so on.
Perhaps the most appropriate public policy is to accept this "natural" role of
the proprietary hospital. Laws outlawing the existence of proprietary hospitals
appear to be inappropriate unless it can be shown that there is an alternative way of
more rapidly meeting the demand for hospital services. The evidence suggests that
proprietary hospitals have played and are playing a useful but limited role in the
provision of hospital services and that they should continue to be permitted to do so.
However, the for-profit hospital does not appear to be a panacea for all the problems
besetting the health care field.
